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Paranormal beliefsa b s t r a c t
Previous studies have reported associations between conspiracist ideation and domain-level facets of
schizotypy, but less is known about associations with lower-order facets. In the present study, 447 adults
completed measures of conspiracist ideation and the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ), con-
sisting of nine subscales grouped into four domains. Results of a multiple regression showed that two
domains of the SPQ signiﬁcantly predicted conspiracist ideation, but multicollinearity was a limiting fac-
tor. In a second regression, we found that the subscales of Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and Ideas of
Reference signiﬁcantly predicted conspiracist ideation, without any multicollinearity constraints. We
interpret these results as implicating two speciﬁc lower-order facets of schizotypy in belief in conspiracy
theories. We further contrast the present results with previous studies indicating associations between
conspiracist ideation and paranormal beliefs.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
A conspiracy theory usually refers to a subset of false narratives
in which the ultimate cause of an event is believed to be due to a
malevolent plot by multiple actors working together (Swami &
Furnham, 2014). Studies have suggested that belief in conspiracy
theories are widespread (e.g., Goertzel, 1994), which is of concern
because they have the potential to sow civic discord and public
mistrust (Swami & Coles, 2010). In response, a new psychology
of conspiracy theories has developed over the past several years,
incorporating multiple perspectives spanning cognitive to differen-
tial psychology (for reviews, see Swami & Coles, 2010; Swami &
Furnham, 2014).
A key focus of this work has been to problematise the tradi-
tional view that conspiracist ideation is the product of individual
or collective psychopathology. Rather, conspiracy theories are
now viewed as a subset of false beliefs that help individuals make
sense of phenomena that are incomprehensible or beyond one’s
control (Swami & Furnham, 2014); that is, they are rational
attempts to deal with the psychological feelings triggered by
complex phenomena. Even so, this perspective does not rule out
the possibility that conspiracist ideation, measured as a differential
trait, will be associated with psychopathological indices, particu-larly those that point to underlying paranoia or delusional thinking
(Swami et al., 2011).
In support of this perspective, researchers have recently begun
examining associations between conspiracist ideation and traits
such as paranoid ideation, superstitious beliefs, magical ideation,
and belief in the paranormal (Brotherton, French, & Pickering,
2013; Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013;
Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Stieger, Gumhalter, Tran,
Voracek, & Swami, 2013; Swami et al., 2011). In addition, three
studies have reported signiﬁcant associations between conspiracist
ideation and schizotypal personality disposition (Bruder et al.,
2013; Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013). Schizotypy is
believed to refer to one’s proneness to schizophrenia and holds
that there is a continuum of cognitive, perceptual, and affective
characteristics and experiences ranging from normal dissociative
states to extreme states (Claridge, 1997). In explanation, it has
been suggested that the relationship is a function of schizotypal
individuals being more open to arguments in support of conspiracy
theories as a result of their suspiciousness of others (Darwin et al.,
2011).
A potential constraint on this explanation, however, has been
the limited way in which schizotypy has been measured in earlier
studies. Thus, Swami et al. (2013) reported that scores on the Unu-
sual Experiences subscale of the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of
Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason, Claridge, & Jackson,
1995) signiﬁcant and positively predicted conspiracist ideation.
Conversely, two other studies have reported signiﬁcant
associations between conspiracist ideation and three domains of
Table 1
Internal consistency reliabilities (Cronbach’s a) of the Schizotypal Personality
Questionnaire subscales.
Subscale Items a
Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking1 7 .77
Unusual Perceptual Experiences1 9 .74
Ideas of Reference2 9 .80
Paranoid Ideation/Suspiciousness2/3 8 .80
Excessive Social Anxiety2/3 8 .81
No Close Friends3 9 .80
Constricted Affect3 8 .76
Odd or Eccentric Behaviour4 7 .86
Odd Speech4 9 .80
Note. Domain: 1Cognitive-perceptual, 2Paranoid, 3Negative, 4Disorganised (Stefanis
et al., 2004).
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naire-Brief (SPQ-B), namely Cognitive-Perceptual Deﬁcit, Interper-
sonal Deﬁcit, and Disorganisation; Bruder et al., 2013; Darwin
et al., 2011). There are, however, questions concerning the reliabil-
ity of the SPQ-B (Axelrod, Grilo, Sanislow, & McGlashan, 2001), as
well as the factorial validity of the three-factor model of schizotypy
(Compton, Goulding, Bakeman, & McClure-Tone, 2009). Moreover,
use of domain-level dimensions may obscure associations between
conspiracist ideation and lower-level schizotypal traits.
In the present study, we sought to extend the available litera-
ture by examining associations between conspiracist ideation
and schizotypy, as measured by the full form of the SPQ, consisting
of nine subscales grouped into four domains. Doing so allowed us
to examine associations between conspiracist ideation and domain
schizotypy, as well as lower-level subscales of the SPQ. In terms of
the latter, two prime candidates for associations with conspiracist
ideation are (i) Paranoid Ideation/Suspiciousness, which would
reﬂect the role of distrust of others, particularly those in authority,
in conspiracist ideation (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami, Chamorro-
Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010), and; (ii) Odd Beliefs or Magical
Thinking, which would be consistent with previous reports of asso-
ciations between conspiracist ideation and paranormal beliefs
(Bruder et al., 2013; Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011, 2013).2. Method
2.1. Participants
The participants of this study were an online, international
sample of 346 women and 101 men, who ranged in age from 18
to 68 (M = 23.17, SD = 7.87). Most participants were from the Uni-
ted States of America (49.1%) and the United Kingdom (36.4%),
with the remainder of the sample consisting of various nations
(14.5%). The sample consisted of 72% who had completed at least
some college, with 98.4% completing high school.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Conspiracist ideation
The Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI; Swami et al.,
2010, 2011) was used to measure general conspiracist ideation.
The BCTI is a 15-item measure that describes a range of interna-
tionally-recognisable conspiracy theories, which are rated for
agreement on a 9-point scale (1 = Completely false, 9 = Completely
true). An overall score is computed as the mean of all items and
higher scores on this scale reﬂect greater conspiracist ideation. Pre-
vious work has shown that the scale is one-dimensional, has good
internal consistency (Swami et al., 2010, 2011), and correlates very
strongly with a non-event-based, generic measure of conspiracist
ideation (Brotherton et al., 2013). In the present study, Cronbach’s
alpha for this scale was .92.
2.2.2. Schizotypy
We used the 74-item Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire
(SPQ; Raine, 1991), which was designed to measure all nine diag-
nostic criteria for schizotypal personality disorder. Each ‘yes’
response counts as one point and nine subscale scores were com-
puted as the total score for all items associated with each subscale.
Table 1 shows Cronbach’s alpha coefﬁcients for the nine subscales
in the present sample, which is in line with the ﬁndings of
Compton et al. (2009). Scores for domains were derived by the
summation of subscale scores. In the original development of the
SPQ, Raine (1991) proposed a three-domain structure; more
recently, however, Compton et al. (2009) reported that a four-
domain model had better ﬁt indices. In the present study,therefore, we computed domain scores based on the four-domain
model (see Table 1; Stefanis et al., 2004).
2.2.3. Demographics
Participants provided their demographic details consisting of
age, sex, country of residence, education, and ethnicity.
2.3. Procedure
Ethics approval was obtained from the relevant university eth-
ics committee.
The survey was launched in March 2012 and ran until January
2014. Survey dissemination was undertaken via multiple routes.
On the one hand, the internal Research Participation Scheme at
the University of Westminster was used. This scheme gives course
credit to students who participate in research undertaken by mem-
bers of staff. No monetary incentives were offered to the partici-
pants for completion of the survey. On the other hand, the
survey was advertised at university-associated online platforms,
primarily for institutions in the USA and UK. The participants gave
a dual-consent; prior to and post-survey.3. Results
Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the present
study are reported in Table 2. An independent-samples t-test
showed that there was no signiﬁcant difference in conspiracist ide-
ation between women (M = 3.82, SD = 1.60) and men (M = 3.83,
SD = 1.73), t(444) = 0.05, p = .963, d < .01, so the sample was com-
bined for all further analyses. Inter-scale correlations between con-
spiracist ideation and the SPQ domains and subscales, respectively,
are reported in Table 2. As can be seen, greater conspiracist idea-
tion was signiﬁcantly associated with higher scores on three SPQ
domains (Cognitive-Perceptual, Paranoid, and Negative). In addi-
tion, greater conspiracist ideation was signiﬁcantly associated with
higher scores on six of the nine SPQ subscales.
To examine the predictive power of schizotypy, we computed
two separate multiple linear regressions using the Enter method.
In the ﬁrst regression, we entered conspiracist ideation as the cri-
terion variable and all SPQ domains as predictor variables. Results
showed that the regression was signiﬁcant, F(4, 446) = 16.24,
p < .001, Adj. R2 = .12. As can be seen in Table 3, Cognitive-Percep-
tual and Disorganised emerged as signiﬁcant predictors of conspir-
acist ideation, although multicollinearity was a limiting issue. In
the second regression, we entered conspiracist ideation as the cri-
terion variable and all SPQ subscales as predictor variables. The
regression was again signiﬁcant, F(9, 446) = 8.75, p < .001, Adj.
R2 = .14. Regression coefﬁcients are reported in Table 4 and, as
can be seen, the only signiﬁcant predictors of conspiracist ideation
Table 2
Descriptive statistics and inter-scale correlations between conspiracist ideation and schizotypy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(1) Conspiracist ideation .22** .32** .23** .14* .09 .32** .25** .28** .24** .03 .10* .10* .08 .08
(2) Total SPQ .79** .91** .91** .84** .58** .79** .77** .81** .65** .74** .76** .72** .78**
(3) CgP domain .66** .55** .60** .86** .90** .67** .60** .35** .41** .42** .54** .55**
(4) Pn domain .87** .62** .46** .67** .86** .87** .74** .60** .61** .50** .62**
(5) Neg domain .65** .37** .57** .59** .78** .78** .86** .85** .53** .63**
(6) Ds domain .39** .65** .55** .57** .43** .53** .60** .89** .91**
(7) OBMT .53** .51** .41** .21** .29** .29** .37** .34**
(8) UPE .65** .62** .39** .42** .44** .56** .60**
(9) IOR .72** .39** .39** .42** .45** .53**
(10) PI .43** .55** .57** .48** .53**
(11) ESA .54** .52** .32** .45**
(12) NCF .73** .46** .48**
(13) CA .49** .58**
(14) OEB .62**
(15) OS
M 3.81 24.09 3.99 9.68 11.24 5.72 1.53 2.46 3.13 2.68 3.87 2.60 2.09 2.30 3.42
SD 1.63 15.48 3.54 6.20 7.67 4.43 1.87 2.18 2.65 2.36 2.54 2.47 2.04 2.35 2.56
Note. SPQ = Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire, CgP = Cognitive-Perceptual, Pn = Paranoid, Neg = Negative, Ds = Disorganised, OMBT = Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking,
UPE = Unusual Perceptual Experiences, IOR = Ideas of Reference, PI = Paranoid Ideation/Suspiciousness, ESA = Excessive Social Anxiety, NCF = No Close Friends, CA = Con-
stricted Affect, OEB = Odd or Eccentric Beliefs, OS = Odd Speech.
* p < .01.
** p < .001.
Table 3
Regression coefﬁcients for the regression predicting conspiracist ideation with SPQ
domains entered as predictors.
B SE b t p Tolerance VIF
Cognitive–
Perceptual
.17 .03 .36 5.74 <.001 .50 2.02
Paranoid .05 .03 .19 .189 .060 .20 4.91
Negative .02 .02 .10 1.02 .307 .23 4.40
Disorganised .07 .02 .18 2.90 .004 .49 2.03
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ticollinearity was not a limiting issue in this regression.
4. Discussion
Our results support previous work (Bruder et al., 2013; Darwin
et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013) showing a robust association
between conspiracist ideation and schizotypy. However, we
believe that previous ﬁndings need to be interpreted with caution:
previous studies have not considered multicollinearity between
SPQ domains as a limiting factor. In our study, although we found
that two SPQ domains signiﬁcantly predicted conspiracist ideation,
multicollinearity meant that conclusions about individual predic-
tors should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, the general con-
clusion that schizotypy is associated with conspiracist ideation
was supported in the present work.
When examining SPQ subscales, Odd Beliefs or Magical
Thinking (OBMT) emerged as the strongest predictor ofTable 4
Regression coefﬁcients for the regression predicting conspiracist ideation with SPQ subsca
B SE b
Ideas of Reference .09 .04 .15
Paranoid .06 .04 .10
Odd Beliefs/Magical Thinking .21 .05 .24
Unusual Perceptual Experiences .08 .05 .10
Odd/Eccentric Behaviour .07 .04 .10
No Close Friends .01 .05 .01
Odd Speech .07 .04 .11
Constricted Affect .03 .06 .04
Suspiciousness .08 .05 .11conspiracist ideation. This subscale and its parent domain have
been shown to be associated with paranormal beliefs (e.g.,
Genovese, 2005; Hergovich, Schott, & Arendasy, 2008), which in
turn are associated with conspiracist ideation (Bruder et al.,
2013;Darwin et al., 2011; Stieger et al., 2013; Swami et al.,
2011). Swami et al. (2011) proposed that the latter association
may reﬂect the fact that both conspiracist ideation and paranormal
beliefs require a rejection of ofﬁcial mechanisms of information
generation and expert opinion. That is, and consistent with the
present results, it would seem that differential traits that lead an
individual to hold unusual beliefs may also lead them to assimilate
conspiracy theories.
What is to some extent unclear, however, is whether OBMT and
paranormal beliefs are different concepts. Hergovich et al. (2008)
showed that some aspects of paranormal beliefs (e.g., belief in pre-
cognition, psi, witchcraft, and spiritualism) were predicted very
well by schizotypy, but other facts such as superstition were not.
This would seem consistent with the ﬁnding that conspiracist ide-
ation is associated with paranormal, but not superstitious, beliefs
(Swami et al., 2011). It is possible that individuals who score highly
on OBMT and/or paranormal beliefs subscribe to larger delusional
systems (Houran, Irwin, & Lange, 2001) that make it more likely
that they will adopt conspiracy theories. Conversely, and as argued
by Swami et al. (2011), it is possible that conspiracy theories ﬁll a
need for control that individuals who score highly on paranormal
beliefs or OBMT might seek.
Our results also showed that Ideas of Reference (IOR) emerged
as a signiﬁcant, albeit relatively weak, predictor of conspiracistles entered as predictors.
t p Tolerance VIF
2.03 .043 .68 1.63
1.77 .077 .63 1.58
4.37 <.001 .66 1.51
1.46 .14 .68 1.47
1.67 .097 .63 1.60
0.16 .872 .70 1.44
1.60 .110 .75 1.31
0.57 .571 .68 1.65
1.52 .129 .60 1.74
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reporting signiﬁcant associations between conspiracist ideation
and paranoia (Darwin et al., 2011; Grzesiak-Feldman & Ejsmont,
2008). Even so, our ﬁnding is important because Paranoid Idea-
tion/Suspiciousness did not signiﬁcantly predict conspiracist idea-
tion in the present sample. That is, it seems that it is the speciﬁc
concept of IOR, rather than suspiciousness of others, that may build
up into a complex conspiracy theory related to the self. Given the
ﬁnding that conspiracy theories are monological (Goertzel, 1994;
Swami et al., 2010), it is plausible that those theories in relation
to the self-assist in the assimilation of conspiracy theories related
to much larger events.
We acknowledge a number of limitations with our study. First,
because we did not include measures other than the BCTI and SPQ,
we are unable to examine any possible measurement overlap with
constructs omitted from the present work. For example, in future
work, it would be useful to concurrently examine the predictive
power of variables such as the OBMT and paranormal beliefs in
relation to conspiracist ideation. Second, although the reliance on
an online recruitment strategy ensured a relatively large sample,
our participants are unlikely to be representative of any one nation
or community. Finally, although our interpretation of our data is
consistent with current theorising (Swami & Furnham, 2014), cau-
sal inferences should be treated with caution because of the cross-
sectional nature of our data.
Overall, the present results extend earlier work in implicating
OBMT and, to a lesser extent IOR, as the primary factors associated
with conspiracist ideation. These results may prove useful for
scholars seeking ways to reduce the inﬂuence of conspiracy theo-
ries. For example, Swami et al. (2013) have suggested that promot-
ing analytic over intuitive thinking may be a useful means of
attenuating the impact of conspiracy theories. Certainly, the pres-
ent results suggest that that may be a line of research worth pur-
suing. More broadly, it would be useful to examine the efﬁcacy
of intervention trials aimed at treating prodromal syndromes in
relation to reducing belief in conspiracy theories.References
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